The Maersk precedent is the right mental model
NotPetya in 2017 remains the reference case because it demonstrated the transmission path clearly. The malware was not aimed at shipping. It reached one company's network, propagated, and took down terminal operations across multiple countries. Cargo sat. Bookings could not be made. Documentation could not issue.
The financial consequence was not confined to the company attacked. Every shipper, forwarder, trucker and receiver in that network had cargo they could not access and invoices they could not raise.
Nine years later, ports are far more digitised and far more interconnected. The World Bank has identified significant cybersecurity preparedness gaps, particularly in lower and middle income countries, and has noted that in an interconnected port system the weakest node determines the scale of the disruption.
Why this is a credit event and not only an IT event
The chain is short:
- Terminal operating system or booking platform is compromised
- Cargo release and documentation issuance stop
- Bills of lading, delivery orders and invoices cannot be generated
- Payment terms, which run from invoice or delivery, do not start
- Everyone in the chain is short of expected cash simultaneously
Note step four in particular. A cyberattack does not just delay payment on existing invoices. It prevents invoices existing at all, which means the receivable does not even appear on an ageing report. The exposure is invisible in the systems designed to track it.
The single-source dependency problem
Most counterparty visibility in shipping depends on data that flows through carrier systems, port community systems or terminal platforms. When one of those goes dark, the visibility goes dark with it.
That is the wrong time to lose sight of a counterparty. During a major incident, the parties most at risk are exactly those whose operational position cannot be confirmed, and the systems that would confirm it are the ones affected.
Independent data sources matter for the same reason redundant systems matter anywhere. Not because they are better in normal conditions, but because they still work in abnormal ones.
Regulatory direction of travel
The US Coast Guard's Cybersecurity in the Marine Transportation System rule, effective from July 2025 with phased compliance deadlines, established the first comprehensive mandatory federal cybersecurity requirements for the domestic maritime sector. Comparable regulatory pressure is building elsewhere.
For credit teams this creates a second-order exposure. Counterparties facing significant compliance investment, or facing penalties for failing to make it, have a capital call that competes with paying suppliers.
What CERTY does about this
Real-time data feeds independent of any single carrier or port system keep counterparty visibility live even when a primary operational system goes dark. Where an incident stops invoicing entirely, behavioural monitoring still shows the operational position of the counterparties involved, which an ageing report cannot.
